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1 Introduction
Often perceived as an effective vehicle to
generate socioeconomic development and
accountable, democratic governance,
decentralisation has for a long time featured
prominently in development strategies. Since the
end of the Cold War, it has also been promoted
and used quite extensively in attempts to
consolidate peace and re-build states in countries
emerging from violent conflict. This is puzzling
because there is little evidence that
decentralisation has actually (a) resulted in
improved service delivery, economic development
and local governance in ‘normal’, non-conflict
development contexts; and (b) helped overcome
the drivers and legacies of violent conflict where
it has occurred, and build capable and
democratic states, particularly in societies shot
through by ethnic and other identity-based
cleavages. The specialised literature shows that
one of the key challenges of decentralisation is
associated with the difficulty of instituting
effective accountability, both locally and between
the local and central levels of government. We
suggest that this difficulty is compounded in
countries that are transitioning out of armed
conflict, where decentralisation is used
simultaneously as both a tool to consolidate
peace and re-build public authority and states.
Using Kosovo as a case study, this article
examines the challenges of decentralisation
reforms in peace-building contexts. Given the
centrality of accountability as both a fundamental
goal of, and pre-requisite for, effective
decentralisation, we ask (a) why it appears to be
particularly difficult to institute accountability
mechanisms in such contexts; and (b) what the
existence of accountability deficits imply for the
prospects of consolidating peace and rebuilding
public authority in countries emerging from
internal armed conflict, and where
decentralisation reforms are a key element of
broader peace-building strategies. Our analysis
focuses on formal, state-led mechanisms of
horizontal and vertical accountability, such as
elections and institutional checks and balances,
but also tangentially incorporates some elements
of the more recent debate about social, citizen-
driven accountability initiatives like public
information campaigns designed to monitor
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These questions are informed by field research
we carried out in 2012 and 2013 on Kosovo’s
decentralisation process and local governance
reforms in the wake of the 1998–9 war (involving
forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and
the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and a major
international military intervention under the
umbrella of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization, NATO), the deployment of the
United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and
Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence
from Serbia in 2008. We found a widespread
sense among Kosovars (both ethnic Albanians
and Serbs) and international donors that
decentralisation was not living up to
expectations. Among the key concerns that were
expressed by central and local government
officials, members of political parties and civil
society organisations (CSOs), academics and
some international donors was that Kosovo still
lacked effective accountability mechanisms.
While it was generally recognised that
decentralisation has helped reduce tensions and
mitigate the potential for a renewed outbreak of
violence between Kosovo Albanians and Serbs,
there was much less enthusiasm about the
performance of the decentralised system of
government and governance in terms of
improving the delivery of local public services
and goods; and almost no indication that the two
ethnic communities were interested in, and
trying to, re-build relationships of cooperation
and trust.
The article starts with a brief discussion of the
relationship between decentralisation and
accountability, which we extend to countries
undergoing war-to-peace transitions. We then
illustrate our argument in reference to the case
of post-independence Kosovo, providing a
succinct analysis of the political context in which
decentralisation was pursued as both a means to
consolidate peace and build a new, sovereign
state under international supervision. Here, we
distinguish between what we call the ‘political’
and ‘functional’ dimensions of decentralisation.
Based on this analysis, we examine some of the
features of what we suggest amounts to nothing
less than a serious accountability deficit in post-
independence Kosovo which risks undermining
both the goal of consolidating peace and building
effective, accountable local governance.
Summarising the presented argument, our
conclusion highlights that more research is
needed to understand how formal and social
accountability mechanisms could be
strengthened in Kosovo and what insights the
case of Kosovo offers for future comparative
research on decentralisation and accountability
in peace-building contexts.
2 Decentralisation, accountability and war-to-
peace transitions
Decentralisation – both as a means to achieving
socioeconomic development and improving public
service delivery and as an end to promoting the
basic principles of democratic governance
(Cheema 2007) – has for a long time commanded
interest among the international development
community. Originally conceived in rather
technical terms as a way to de-concentrate
hierarchical government structures and
bureaucracies, in the ‘mid-1980s, the concept was
broadened to include political power-sharing,
democratization, and market liberalization’
(Cheema and Rondinelli 2007: 2). Subsequently,
after the end of the Cold War and amidst the rise
of the good governance agenda, ‘decentralization
[became] seen as a way of opening governance to
wider public participation through civil society
organizations’ (Cheema and Rondinelli 2007: 3).
Usefully described as referring to the ‘territorial
distribution of power’ (Smith 1985: 1),
decentralisation – administrative, political, fiscal
and economic – has taken different forms ‘along a
continuum which represents the varying levels of
decentralisation associated with different
organizational and constitutional arrangements’,
ranging from ‘complete independence to
complete integration’ (Smith 1985: 12).
Among the basic assumptions that have guided
the design and implementation of
decentralisation are that it helps to ‘accelerate
economic development, increase political
accountability, and enhance public participation
in governance’ (Cheema and Rondinelli 2007: 7).
Decentralisation has also been perceived as
instrumental for breaking ‘bottlenecks in
hierarchical bureaucracies and assist local
officials and the private sector to cut through
complex procedures and get decisions made and
implemented more quickly’ (Cheema and
Rondinelli 2007: 7). By promoting greater
political representation of diverse political,
ethnic and religious groups decentralisation is
furthermore presumed to contribute to
mitigating the risk of compromising the unity of
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the state. This last point is of particular
importance in post-conflict settings.
Yet there is surprisingly little evidence showing
that decentralisation has actually contributed to
achieving these important goals. A review of the
specialised literature finds that ‘there is a vast
chasm between the benefits that proponents of
decentralisation have claimed that reforms can
have on service delivery, economic development
and social cohesion and the reality, according to
empirical research’ (Scott 2009: 5). Indeed, it has
been shown that the ‘relationships between
decentralization and various development
variables have more often than not been
negative’ (Cheema and Rondinelli 2007: 8).
Among the main reasons that are cited to
explain this gap between theory and reality are
that decentralisation may increase the risk of
elite capture of local governments and result in
the strengthening of informal patronage
networks and patron–client relationships; that
local governments may be unable to raise
sufficient financial resources to provide services
effectively; that decentralisation can entail the
loss of economies of scale; and that there may be
a heightened risk of corruption and the misuse of
public authority and resources at the local
government level (Bardhan and Mookherjee
2006; Cheema 2007; Cheema and Rondinelli
2007; Scott 2009).
In many developing countries these problems
have been associated with the difficulty of
instituting effective vertical and horizontal
accountability mechanisms, such as through
regular (free and fair) elections and functioning
institutional checks and balances, respectively.1
This constitutes nothing short of a dilemma
because more and stronger accountability is both
one of the fundamental goals of decentralisation,
which aims to increase the capacity of citizens to
hold local government officials to account, and a
pre-requisite for effective decentralisation.
Decentralisation thus faces the challenge of
seeking to strengthen accountability by bringing
decision-making closer to local communities
while at the same time, to be effective, it is
dependent on the commitment on the part of
local leaders and citizens to accountability as
well as on the existence of local capacity to
exercise it. Yet such commitment and capacity
may well be elusive. As Pranab Bardhan and
Dilip Mookherjee explain:
[D]ecentralization is unlikely to be a universal
panacea for problems of accountability. […]
Local democracy requires a set of
prerequisites, including an educated and
politically aware citizenry, an absence of high
inequality in economic or social status that
inhibits political participation of the poor or of
minorities, a prevalence of law and order, the
conduct of free and fair elections according to
a constitutional setting that prevents
excessive advantage to incumbents, effective
competition between political candidates or
parties with long-term interests, the presence
of reliable information channels to citizens
(for example, from an active, independent
media), and the presence of oversight
mechanisms both formal (legislatures,
judiciary, independent auditors) and informal
(such as civil society organizations) (Bardhan
and Mookherjee 2006: 9).
The fate of decentralisation therefore hinges to a
significant extent on the existence of an
environment conducive to the exercise of
accountability. Yet in development contexts ‘both
vertical and horizontal forms of accountability
have [often] been found to be unsatisfactory on
many counts (e.g. inadequate electoral processes,
insufficient checks and balances instituted by the
state, secrecy laws, lack of entry points for
citizens, particularly of marginalized groups)’
(UNDP 2010: 9).
In recognition of these problems the debate has
more recently been broadened out to not only
focus on ‘formal’, ‘state-driven’ and ‘top-down’
mechanisms but also on ‘social’, ‘citizen-led’ and
‘bottom-up’ accountability initiatives. Social
accountability has been defined as comprising
vertical, non-electoral mechanisms of ‘control of
political authorities that [rest] on the actions of
an array of citizens’ associations and movements
and the media. The actions of these groups
monitor public officials, expose governmental
wrongdoing, and can activate the operation of
horizontal agencies. Social accountability
employs both institutional and non-institutional
tools’ (Peruzzotti and Smulovitz 2006: 10),
including, for instance, public information and
anti-corruption campaigns, citizen report cards
and participatory budgeting.
While the emergence of such initiatives has been
observed and documented in a growing number of
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developing countries and while generally their
(potential) usefulness has been presumed, there is
no consensus about the impact of social
accountability mechanisms on governance, public
service delivery and development. In effect, recent
research suggests that ‘social accountability in the
form of demand side pressures by itself is unlikely
to be successful. Successful cases rely heavily on
reforms or support from the supply side [of
accountability] in the form of reformist
bureaucrats, alliances across the public–private
divide and changes in the broader incentives
within which the public sector operates’ (Joshi and
Houtzager 2012: 153). Furthermore, it is not yet
fully understood why citizens come together to
demand social accountability in some
circumstances and not in others, and who engages
in these processes (Joshi 2008).
Against the backdrop of this brief discussion of
the interdependencies between decentralisation
and accountability, and the challenges associated
with them, it is puzzling that in the past two
decades decentralisation has quite consistently
also been promoted – and used – as a tool to
consolidate peace and re-build states in the wake
of internal war (Brinkerhoff 2011). The
conditions in countries that are emerging from
violent conflict are arguably even more adverse
than in ‘normal’ development settings. Societies
transitioning out of conflict are fractured and
polarised, state institutions have been destroyed
or become militarised, and accountability is
severely limited or absent, to name but a few of
the grave legacies of violent conflict. This
notwithstanding, strategies to build peace and
reconstruct states in countries that witnessed
civil and ethnic conflict have frequently
incorporated decentralisation as part of other
institutional measures to enable power-sharing
among the contending groups and protect the
civil and political rights of minorities.
Theoretically, decentralisation can be an element
of approaches to build peace through both
‘liberalisation’ and ‘institutionalisation’, to use
the terminology developed by Roland Paris (Paris
2004). However, containing different conceptions
of the role and significance of accountability in
the peace-building process, we suggest that the
two approaches are not equally suited to create
the necessary conditions to ‘make
decentralisation work’; i.e. strengthen local
service delivery and economic development and
promote the principles of accountable,
democratic governance.
Accountability is a key concern of those who
emphasise the centrality of democratic
institutions and politics (especially free and fair
elections), the rigorous protection of human
rights, and a strong rule of law in war-to-peace
transitions. These goals are perceived to depend
fundamentally on the creation of both vertical
and horizontal mechanisms through which
citizens can hold decision-makers and public
officials to account. In contrast, proponents of a
narrower, stability-oriented approach to peace-
building are likely to pay less attention to issues
of accountability, especially in the early post-
conflict period. Their principal aim is to maintain
a stable security environment and keep the
contending parties separate and spoilers at bay.
In this conception, accountability acquires its
true significance as part of a process of instituting
representative democracy and a free market
economy only once the peace has been secured.
In practice, the stability-oriented, ‘realist’
approach has tended to trump the ‘liberal’
conception in what often – and inevitably – have
been challenging, messy and (self)-interested
engagements by the ‘international community’
to end violent conflict and re-build war-torn
societies and states. This has important
implications for the effectiveness of
decentralisation as a peace-building tool. To
begin with, introducing a decentralised system of
government can promote the ‘freezing’ of
(perceived or real) animosities and
incompatibilities between different ethnic or
other identity-based groups. As different
communities are ‘accommodated’ within
separate administrative and territorial entities
(municipalities), the incentives for integration
and inter-ethnic cooperation may be reduced.
More intransigent and vocal elements among the
majority groups may be incentivised to continue
to bolster their political power through extremist
discourses and other hostile acts. Indeed, it has
been noted that even the most carefully designed
decentralisation framework cannot fully prevent
the re-emergence of inter-ethnic or identity-
based violence (Roeder and Rothchild 2005).
Pursuing decentralisation in post-conflict
settings therefore carries the risk of becoming a
self-defeating undertaking in terms of
consolidating peace.2
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The problems of decentralisation in war-to-peace
transitions are compounded, as discussed earlier,
by the fact that it cannot work properly and
deliver on its promises of strengthening local
service delivery and development in the absence
of sufficiently strong accountability mechanisms.
One important issue in this respect is that peace-
building and stabilisation missions leave deep
footprints in the countries of intervention. While
the mandates of the interventions and of the
international actors tasked with implementing
them differ from case to case, accountability
often runs upwards from the central host
governments to the international agencies and
donors, and not downwards to communities and
citizens. Further, for a number of reasons,
including standard immunities enjoyed by
international personnel deployed to crisis or
conflict settings, international officials can
commonly not be held accountable by local
authorities because they are answerable to their
headquarters and the governments of troop
contributing and donor countries (Caplan c.2005;
Visoka 2012).
In these situations the conditions are not given
for local leaders to commit to being answerable
to citizens and public control and oversight
institutions, which, at any rate, are likely to be
politicised and quite unable to perform their
functions. As we discuss in Section 4 in relation
to Kosovo, the aim of local officials, particularly
mayors, will be to strengthen their own standing
vis-à-vis their political party hierarchy, the
central government and the international
stabilisation apparatus. Common citizens, in
turn, have to navigate carefully the many pitfalls
that exist in post-conflict settings. Potentially
caught in a ‘no war, no peace’ situation on
account of ethnic-territorial decentralisation –
among other issues like persisting geopolitical
tensions, pervasive clientelism and the
proliferation of organised criminality – they are
locked into relationships of dependence with the
leaders of ‘their’ group and have little, if any,
recourse to functioning public mechanisms of
accountability and redress. While the concept of
social accountability has recently started to gain
some currency in debates about peace-building
and state reconstruction, in light of the above it
has to be recognised that the emergence of such
initiatives faces significant constraints in post-
conflict settings shot through by deep ethnic and
other cleavages (Lakhani 2013; UNDP 2010).
3 Decentralisation in post-independence Kosovo
Following NATO military action in April–June
1999, which led to the end of the 18-month
‘Kosovo war’ involving forces of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia and the KLA, UNMIK
deployed under UN Security Council Resolution
1244. UNMIK was mandated to administer the
territory of Kosovo by means of an interim
civilian administration and oversee the transfer
of authority from Kosovo’s provisional
institutions to a set of new institutions, which
would substantially enhance the autonomy of the
people of Kosovo vis-à-vis the Serbian
government in Belgrade.
After years of international community-led
‘status negotiations’ between Prishtina and
Belgrade – triggered by a renewed outbreak of
heavy ethnic rioting in Kosovo in 2004 – former
Finnish President Martti Athisaari tabled the
Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status
Settlement or, in short, ‘Athisaari Plan’.
Although the plan was ultimately not endorsed
by the UN Security Council, it prepared the
ground for Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of
independence in February 2008, which
unsurprisingly has not been recognised by
Serbia.3 Serving as the blueprint for Kosovo’s
new constitution, the plan provided the
framework for progressing decentralisation
(which had started under the international
administration in 2003) and other far-reaching
institutional and economic reform measures in
the post-independence period. Significantly, the
Athisaari proposal foresaw the creation of
several new municipalities with special
competencies in order to protect the rights and
identity of Kosovo’s minority ethnic groups,
including its Serb communities.
Following the adoption of Kosovo’s constitution
in June 2008, the Laws on Local Self-
Government (LLSG),4 Local Elections (LLE),5
Administrative Municipal Boundaries (LAMB),6
and Local Government Finance (LLGF)7 were
approved by the new state’s legislature – the
Kosovo Assembly. Four new Serb-majority
municipalities with ‘extended competencies’
were created in the wake of the local elections of
2009 (Gracanica, Partes, Ranilug and Klokot)
and one, Novo Brdo, was extended. The chances
are that following an agreement between
Prishtina and Belgrade, which was brokered by
the European Union and entered into effect in
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April 2013, decentralisation could now also
contribute to resolving the stand-off between
Kosovo and Serbia over four Serb municipalities
in the north of Kosovo (Zvecan, Zubin Potok,
Leposavic and Mitrovica North).8 Since
independence, they had de facto been outside of
Prishtina’s control.9 In November 2013, local
elections were held in all of the country’s 36
municipalities, including for the first time in the
north.
There is little doubt that this ‘political’
dimension of decentralisation has been the main
driver of the process. It has had strong backing
from the main international players in Kosovo
and the Western Balkans, i.e. the EU, the USA
and the UN. A core part of the international
peace-building effort, decentralisation was used
as a ‘tool’ to attract the Serbian minority
community in Kosovo to accept and adhere to
the institutions of the new government in
Prishtina by creating Serb-majority
municipalities with special competencies.
Furthermore, decentralisation and the
cooperation of the Serb community with Kosovo’s
new institutions were conceived as a means to
help diminish the influence and presence of
‘parallel’, Belgrade-funded government and
public service structures for the Serb community
in the country. The stance of the major donors in
Kosovo has consistently been that
‘decentralisation has to work; we will not let the
Serbs of Kosovo alone’.10
Yet decentralisation has not been a political
project to which Kosovo’s Albanian majority and
political elites would have related easily and over
which they would have had significant control. In
effect, Kosovo’s authorities seem to have adopted
the position that accepting the Athisaari Plan,
including its core provisions on decentralisation,
was the price they had to pay for independence
from Serbia. Six years after independence,
Kosovars and international donors are finding
that decentralisation is not living up to
expectations. We suggest that this
disenchantment is related to the hybrid nature
of the reform, which was designed by the
international community to serve foremost
‘political’ (peace-building) but also ‘functional’
(state-building) purposes. Enabling citizens to
hold their locally elected mayors and municipal
assemblies to account has been a core aim of the
‘functional’ dimension of decentralisation.
However, as we discuss in the next section,11
achieving this goal has not been straightforward.
By giving extensive powers to municipal mayors
the new decentralisation framework actually
established limits to the exercise of local
accountability.12
3.1 Key features of ‘functional’ decentralisation in
Kosovo
Kosovo’s decentralisation framework stipulates
the transfer of many competencies to the local
level, providing, in line with the Athisaari Plan
and Kosovo’s constitution, for differentiated
treatment of municipalities where the Serb
community is in the majority. ‘Own’
competencies apply across all municipalities and
range from local economic development and the
provision and maintenance of public services and
utilities, including water supply and waste
management, to the provision of public pre-
primary, primary and secondary education and
public primary health care.13 In addition to
municipalities ‘own’ competencies, the central
government may delegate responsibility to
municipalities regarding, inter alia, cadastral
records, business registration and forestry
protection.14 ‘Enhanced’ competencies apply only
to municipalities in which the Kosovo Serb
community is in the majority, and they cover
secondary health care, university education,
culture and the selection of local police station
commanders. It is noteworthy that the LLSG
stipulates that the exercise of the ‘enhanced’
competencies is subject to monitoring by the
central government, which is not the case with
‘own’ competencies over which municipalities
have ‘full and exclusive’ powers.
A particular characteristic of Kosovo’s
decentralised system of government is that it
gives extensive powers to the municipal
executive, the mayor, who is directly elected by
the municipal electorate in a majority rule
system.15 The mayor is the figurehead in local
governance, as he/she represents and acts on
behalf of the municipality, conducting all
financial administration (including proposing
and executing the municipal budget) (LLSG,
Article 58). The mayor is charged with
organising the establishment, staffing and
financial management of the municipal
administration (including the appointment of
the municipal directors), directing municipal
policy, and reporting to the municipal assembly
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on the economic and financial situation of the
municipality. The mayor must provide any
information that the supervisory authority
(central government) requests, including all acts
adopted by the municipal assembly (LLSG,
Article 78.1). In practice, it is the mayor and the
municipal directors who keep close contact with
the central government and the relevant line
ministries, seeking to influence, for instance, the
budget process which is controlled by the central
government.
Mayors are the key actors in managing the often
difficult relations between the municipal and
central levels of government, both as individual
elected officeholders and through the
Association of Kosovo Municipalities (AKM).
While mayors work upon the higher political
contacts in the central government and their
respective political parties, the municipal
directors are dealing directly and on a constant
basis with their respective line ministries in
order to resolve specific issues. AKM fulfils the
crucial role of a broker in municipal–central
government relations. As an non-governmental
organisation (NGO) funded by voluntary
membership fees from the municipalities and
international donor support, AKM’s mission is
‘to create efficient, sustainable and democratic
local government through high quality
performance in providing services according to
the needs of citizens. In its founding documents,
AKM claims to dedicate its activities to fostering
good governance at the local level, harmonising
the division of labour between central and local
authorities, and advocating for decentralised
governance that avoids unnecessary parallelism
and centralist tendencies’ (UBO Consulting
2011: 11).
AKM appears to be generally well regarded
among municipal authorities (as well as the
central government) for the lobbying in national
legislative processes it undertakes is seen as a
significant contribution to the strengthening of
the municipalities and local governance.16
However, a recent assessment report on AKM
stated that some international donors believe
that the association ‘is occasionally used as an
instrument by municipality mayors to advance
their narrow interest’ and that there is a
tendency to ‘make the AKM an organization of
mayors and less of municipalities’ (UBO
Consulting 2011: 37). The chairs of municipal
assemblies are not represented in AKM and
there are no ‘independent’ citizen or CSO
representatives. As has been observed by the
International Civilian Office (ICO), there is a
need to ‘balance the overpowering of municipal
mayors’ and, by implication the political parties,
which puts AKM at risk of becoming politicised
(UBO Consulting 2011: 37). For instance, if the
ruling party does not want [to] support
amendments to a certain law for political reasons
it is likely that the amendments will not
happen.17
Although by law the ‘highest representative body
of the municipality’ (LLSG, Article 35), the
municipal assembly plays a rather subordinate
role in local governance. Our research revealed
that the mayors are generally more visible and
better known among the electorate than the
members of municipal assemblies.18 In part this is
so because assembly members are elected through
an open party-list proportional representation
system (LLE, Article 7), while mayors are elected
directly through majority rule. Further, it is
usually the mayors who have a ‘direct connection’
to the party leadership, not the members of
municipal assemblies. The responsibilities of the
assembly range from approval of the budget and
investment plans and the adoption, amendment
or repeal of the rules of procedure and municipal
regulations to the establishment of the assembly
committees, naming and renaming of roads and
making inter-municipal and intra-municipal
agreements (LLSG, Article 40). Among its most
important functions is arguably approving the
municipal budget. However, in practice this
function does not carry much meaning and
significance. In municipalities where the chair of
the assembly (elected by the assembly from
among its members) belongs to the same political
party as the mayor, the chances are that the
municipal legislature fails to exercise rigorous
scrutiny of the actions and decisions of the
municipal executive.
Kosovo’s decentralisation framework does not
contain an administrative–political tier below
the level of the municipality. According to the
LLSG, the Ministry of Local Government
Administration (MLGA) may ‘issue instructions’
on the arrangements between the municipality
and the villages (LLSG, Article 34.3). Villages
can carry out activities that are within the
responsibility of the municipal government if
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they are given permission. Municipalities must
provide sufficient resources for this (LLSG,
Article 34.2). While there are village councils
and leaders, as well as a coordinator in the
mayor’s office charged with liaising with village
representatives, their selection, functions and
competencies are not defined by law; their work
is not remunerated; and there are no specific
lines in the municipal budgets for the village
councils/leaders.
Relations between municipalities and villages are
therefore rather informal and may be subject to
mediation by political party membership, i.e.
relations between the mayor and the village
leaders are likely to be closer if they are members
of the same political party.19 In some instances,
village leaders are appointed by the mayor after
consultation with the village councils, in others
they are ‘selected’ by residents. The influence of
village leaders on local decision-making is,
however, mostly limited to representing villages
in consultations about matters related to the
municipal budget and infrastructure investment.
These consultations are commonly arranged in a
‘top-down’ fashion by the mayors. The municipal
assembly committees, whose members are
elected by the municipal assembly, tend to
exercise a merely formal role.
Finally, according to the LLSG, any person or
organisation with a particular interest in the
municipality may attend public meetings, and
representatives of NGOs can attend consultative
committees and ‘may submit proposals, conduct
research and provide opinions on municipal
assembly initiatives in accordance with the
Municipal Statute’ (LLSG, Articles 68.1. and
73.2). However, the number of active CSOs
(including NGOs, professional associations,
social membership organisations) in Kosovo is
still quite low. The most visible and vocal ones
are based in Prishtina, and overall they enjoy
better access to international donor funds than
CSOs in smaller and/or rural municipalities. In
Viti and Peja, the authors found that there was a
sense among local CSO representatives that the
decentralisation process is not yet fully
understood by citizens, that ‘governance sits in
Prishtina’ (Viti), and that CSOs do not play a
significant part in municipal affairs (Peja). By
the same token, it was pointed out that the
decentralisation process needs to be taken
further, in particular with respect to including
village leaders and councils more, and in a more
formal way, in local governance arrangements by
providing them specific competencies.20
4 Decentralisation and Kosovo’s accountability
deficit
Well into the second year after the end of
‘internationally supervised independence’ in
2012 there are concerns that the country still
lacks sufficiently strong accountability
mechanisms. Interviews with representatives of
the governing Democratic Party of Kosovo
(PDK), the political opposition, NGOs, citizen
groups and international donors revealed that a
broad range of political and social sectors in the
country feel that the checks on the exercise of
public authority are strong on paper but weak in
practice.21 As one senior government official put
it: ‘We have the [decentralised and democratic]
system in place but we need to make it work
better through strengthened accountability’.22
Yet these concerns about Kosovo’s accountability
deficit are usually framed in the sense that
without more effective accountability the country
will be unable to address serious problems of poor
service delivery, rampant unemployment, weak
economic growth and pervasive corruption
(European Commission 2011; IKS 2010). While
these are certainly important issues, it is less
often explicitly recognised that stronger
accountability is also a necessary pre-requisite for
Kosovo’s decentralised system of government to
be able to promote the basic principles of
democratic governance and help mend the rift
between the country’s Albanian majority and
Serb minority. The post-independence creation of
the Serb-majority municipalities with ‘enhanced
competencies’ and the 2013 agreement between
Prishtina and Belgrade on the status of the four
Serb municipalities in the north have helped to
allay fears that the rights, security and welfare of
the Serb minority in Kosovo would not be
protected. These measures have also contributed
to keeping the tense relations between Kosovo
and Serbia manageable.
However, the international community-led
strategy to appease Serbia and accommodate
Kosovo’s Serb minority through the creation of
municipalities with special competencies as part
of a complex decentralisation process has
resulted in an artificial and potentially volatile
situation. The challenges ahead are formidable.
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If left unaddressed they stand to undermine the
prospects of inter-ethnic cooperation and
peaceful coexistence of Albanians and Serbs in a
decentralised Kosovo, the country’s
socioeconomic development and, ultimately, its
accession to the EU.23
With respect to formal accountability, our
research shows that among the key issues that
need to be addressed is the dominant position of
the mayor in municipal governance and in
managing the relations between the
municipalities and the central government
(including through AKM). This involves
strengthening the capacity of municipal assembly
members to demand accountability from the
mayor and the municipal administration. Also,
beyond the top-down, token recognition of their
role in local governance and participation in
municipal affairs, village leaders and councils and
local CSOs would have to be enabled and
empowered to partake in a more meaningful and
effective way in municipal decision-making. This
is increasingly being recognised, including by
some international donors who deplore the lack
of close-enough cooperation between the
municipal institutions and CSOs and fear that
projects to strengthen citizen participation may
therefore not be sustainable in the longer term.24
While strengthening formal accountability
mechanisms would require amendments to the
existing legal framework – such as in relation to
the LLSG’s provisions on the competencies of the
mayor, the municipal assembly and village
leaders – the issue is more complex than that.25
The extent of the problem has been captured as
one where the ‘creation and reform of political
institutions that comprise the post-1999 state-
building process has concentrated on formal
institutions, with the aim of developing a liberal
democratic structure underpinned by norms such
as accountability, transparency and other
[elements] of good governance’ (KLGI 2014: 5).
Yet ‘behind the construct of the formal state,
alternative informal structures and logics
operate to determine politics [and governance]
in Kosovo’ (ibid.). In this hybrid political order
‘formal and informal systems […] are not
separate but co-exist and interact’ (KLGI 2014: 6).
Importantly, relations between the electorate
and political leaders are structured essentially by
informal patron–client exchanges and
transactions, not by formal and transparent
procedures that would be subject to regular
public oversight and scrutiny (Democracy for
Development Institute 2013).
Kosovo’s political parties are at the heart of this
clientelistic system. It involves national ‘super
patrons’ (party bosses and central government
officials), local ‘patrons’ (local politicians, mayors
and municipal directors) who strive to amass
votes for their respective ‘super patrons’, and
common citizens in their capacity of patronage-
dependent voters (KLGI 2014). In what has been
aptly described as a system of ‘reverse
accountability’, local politicians hold citizens to
account, i.e. make sure that they voted for them
and their party, not the other way round. At the
same time, there is a marked tendency among
politicians to see themselves as being accountable
to the ‘internal hierarchy of the party they
represent’ (KLGI 2014: 19), not to the public
(Democracy for Development Institute 2013).
Initially spurred by UNMIK’s problematic policy
of accommodating the leaders of Kosovo’s main
post-war political parties26 by co-opting them into
power-sharing arrangements, over time clientelism
took root in the public administration and the
civil service (ibid.). It cuts across ethnic lines and
equally affects common Kosovo Albanians and
Kosovo-Serbs. Both groups are heavily dependent
on employment in the public sector and other
‘favours’ handed down to them from political
party bosses, local and central government
officials and, in the case of the Kosovo-Serbs, the
Serbian government in Belgrade.27
Confirming the observation discussed earlier
that decentralisation is not a panacea for
addressing problems of accountability (and by
extension problems of local governance and poor
service delivery), the case of Kosovo also shows
that decentralisation in and of itself does not
promote the bridging of ethnic and other
identity cleavages that were at the root of the
armed conflict. Arguably, this is the case, at least
partly, because in the absence of sufficiently
strong accountability mechanisms the prospects
for cooperation, dialogue and the building of
relationships of trust between the Albanian
majority and the Serb minority are slim. On both
sides the perception prevails that in the new
state public institutions do not function in an
accountable and transparent way, the rule of law
is not being upheld, and common citizens are
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dependent on the favours they receive from local
patrons who themselves are locked into
patronage relationships with their bosses in
Prishtina or Belgrade.28
Under these circumstances, there are few, if any,
incentives for Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo-
Serbs to cooperate with one another. Recent
research shows that ‘ethnic groups are still
highly separated in their daily lives and only very
few initiatives cross-cutting ethnic affiliation
exist in civil society’ (Loew 2013: 8). The ‘ethnic
dimension’ of decentralisation in Kosovo,
reflected in the creation of the new Serb-
majority municipalities, appears to have worked
against strengthening inter-ethnic contact and
cooperation (Loew 2013). This situation is
compounded by the country’s dependence on
international aid, Belgrade’s continued funding
of parallel institutions for Kosovo’s Serb
community, high unemployment rates and a
weak civil society (especially at the local level
outside of the capital Prishtina) and media
(which locally depends on contracts with the
municipalities and in the capital is often
controlled by the political parties).29
It is thus not surprising that there has been very
little by way of citizen-led initiatives to hold
decision-makers to account since Kosovo
declared independence in 2008, including
initiatives that would have spanned the
persisting ethnic divides. While some civil society
groups have sporadically voiced demands for
better public services, such as in the spring of
2013 in relation to the high cost of electricity,
these initiatives did not endure. They also did
not reach much beyond Prishtina and involve
both Albanian and Serb communities. Regardless
of their ethnic identity, Kosovars have mostly
focused on dealing with the many problems that
affect their daily lives, such as finding jobs and
accessing education and health services. Even
when citizens have initiated a campaign this has
tended to be focused on resolving a specific issue,
not to push for the establishment of stronger
mechanisms of accountability.30
5 Conclusions
Focusing on the case of Kosovo, in this article we
have discussed the challenges of decentralisation
reforms in peace-building contexts. Our brief
review of the literature on decentralisation shows
that the effective exercise of accountability is a
principal requirement for decentralisation to
achieve its goals of enhancing socioeconomic
development, improving public service delivery
and promoting the basic principles of democratic
governance at the local level. Yet in many
developing countries where decentralisation
reforms have been implemented the institutional,
political and social conditions for the exercise of
accountability are not given or only to a limited
extent. While social or citizen-led accountability
initiatives – as distinct from formal or state-
driven accountability mechanisms like elections
and institutional checks and balances – have
emerged and are being promoted in response to
this problem, there is no consensus among
scholars regarding the impact of such initiatives
on local governance, public service delivery and
development. It is also not yet fully understood
why social accountability initiatives emerge in
some contexts and not in others and how their
emergence is related to the supply of
accountability by the state.
Given these significant questions and
uncertainties about the inter-relationship
between decentralisation and accountability, we
have posited that it is puzzling that
decentralisation has also been promoted quite
widely as a tool to consolidate peace and re-build
states in countries emerging from violent
conflict. We suggest that in such settings the
exercise of accountability is even more
challenging than in non-conflict, ‘normal’
development contexts, not least because of the
presence of international stabilisation and peace-
building missions which, if at all, tend to be only
marginally accountable to the governments of
their host countries, let alone to their citizens.
Our discussion of the case of Kosovo suggests that
decentralisation and the creation of municipalities
with special competencies for ethnic minority
groups, including Serbs, has been quite successful
in terms of mitigating ethnic tensions and
preventing the resurgence of violence after
independence in 2008. But decentralisation has
contributed little to enhancing cooperation and
trust between Kosovo’s Albanian and Serb
communities for the thrust of the international
peace-building strategy has been to accommodate
(i.e. separate administratively and territorially)
rather than integrate the different ethnic
communities (we refer to this as the ‘political’
dimension of decentralisation). This situation has
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been compounded by some of the characteristics
of what we have called the ‘functional’ dimension
of decentralisation, particularly in respect to the
powers assigned to the municipal mayors vis-à-vis
the central government and the municipal
assemblies, and the associated lack of accountability
of the mayors vis-à-vis local populations.
In the absence of stronger accountability
mechanisms the prospects for improving local
governance and service delivery as well as
establishing cooperation, dialogue and trust
between the Albanian majority and the Serb
minority are slim. On both sides the perception
prevails that in the new state public institutions
do not function in an accountable and
transparent way, the rule of law is not being
upheld, and common citizens are dependent on
the favours they receive from local patrons who
are locked into patronage relationships with
their bosses in Prishtina or Belgrade. We suggest
that this undercuts any incentives that might
exist on the part of the two communities to
cooperate across ethnic lines and engage in joint
initiatives to demand accountability from
decision-makers and political leaders at the local
and national levels. The fact that there have
been only a few localised, short-lived and issue-
based citizen initiatives in this respect appears to
reflect this bleak reality.
Looking ahead, more research needs to be
undertaken on how accountability mechanisms,
both formal and social, could be strengthened in
Kosovo in order to make decentralisation work
and deliver on its goals of both improving local
governance and service delivery and
consolidating peace. The case of Kosovo stands
to offer valuable insights into how the complex
issues of decentralisation and accountability
could be addressed in more effective and less
harmful ways in other (future) peace-building
contexts, and it would be useful to include it in
comparative cross-country analyses.
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Notes
1 We define the term ‘accountability’ as
referring to ‘the various norms, practices, and
institutions whose purpose is to hold public
officials (and other bodies) answerable for
their actions and for the outcomes of those
actions. […] Vertical accountability pertains
to the relationship between entities of
unequal “rank”, such as a government to its
citizens or an employer to his or her
employees. Horizontal accountability concerns
the relationship among entities of equal
“rank”, such as the independent pillars of a
government or society (for example, the
courts or media vis-à-vis the executive)’
(Caplan c.2005: 2–3).
2 One often-cited example in this respect –
strongly reminiscent of the experience in
Kosovo, which is discussed in this article – is
Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) after the 1992–5
war involving Bosnian Muslims, Croats and
Serbs. As Vesna Bojicic-Dzelilovic writes, ‘the
lines of division between BiH’s three main
ethnic communities, which were created
through conflict, have not softened despite
elaborate power-sharing schemes.
Disintegrative forces remained strong, and
ethnically motivated violence, although
sporadic, has continued (Bojicic-Dzelilovic
2003: 288). What is more, ‘in BiH,
decentralisation has been perceived as an
opportunity to weaken the state; power-
sharing based on the primacy of ethnic
affiliation has thus, in effect, reinforced
centrifugal tendencies rather than provided a
framework for multi-ethnic cohabitation’
(Bojicic-Dzelilovic 2003: 300–1).
3 As of February 2014, five EU member states
(Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and
Spain) and 86 UN member states (out of 193)
had not recognised Kosovo as an independent
and sovereign state.
4 Law on Local Self-Government (LLSG),
March 2008, www.assembly-kosova.org/
common/docs/ligjet/2008_03-L040_en.pdf
(accessed 10 June 2014).
5 Law on Local Elections (LLE), March 2008,
www.assembly-kosova.org/common/docs/ligjet/
2008_03-L072_en.pdf (accessed 10 June 2014).
6 Law on Administrative Municipal Boundaries
(LAMB), March 2008, www.assembly-
kosova.org/common/docs/ligjet/2008_03-
L041_en.pdf (accessed 10 June 2014).
7 Law on Local Government Finance (LLGF),
March 2008, www.assembly-kosova.org/
common/docs/ligjet/2008_03-L049_en.pdf
accessed 10 June 2014).
8 Among the key provisions contained in the
bilateral agreement of April 2013 are: (a) the
creation of an association of Serb-majority
municipalities that shall be similar in terms of
structure and functions to the Association of
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Kosovo Municipalities (AKM) and shall have a
representative role vis-à-vis the central
government authorities; (b) the police in
northern Kosovo shall be integrated into the
Kosovo Police; (c) members of other Serbian
security structures in northern Kosovo shall
be offered a place in equivalent Kosovo
structures; (d) there shall be a regional police
commander for the four northern Serb-
majority municipalities who shall be a Kosovo
Serb; (e) the judicial authorities in the
northern Serb-majority municipalities shall be
integrated and operate within Kosovo’s legal
framework; and (f) municipal elections shall
be organised and held in the northern
municipalities in 2013.
9 Authors’ interviews, government, political
opposition, NGO and international donor
representatives, Prishtina, 22–24 April 2013. 
10 Authors’ interview, senior international donor
official, Prishtina, 15 February 2012.
11 This section draws heavily on the authors’
assessment report of the Swiss Agency for
Development and Cooperation’s
decentralisation, state-building and
democracy promotion portfolio in Kosovo
(Schultze-Kraft and Morina 2012). 
12 More research is needed to establish why the
office of the mayor was given such extensive
powers and what the rationale of the
international community might have been to
support the design of legislation to that effect.  
13 See list of ‘own competencies’ in LLSG,
Article 17.
14 See list of ‘delegated competencies’ in LLSG,
Article 18. 
15 Each municipality functions as a single
electoral district. Candidates for mayor of a
municipality are elected if they receive more
than 50 per cent plus one vote of the total
valid votes cast in that municipality. If none of
the candidates receives more than 50 per cent
plus one vote, a run-off election will be held.
The candidate who wins the majority of votes
in the second round is elected mayor (LLE,
Article 9). 
16 For instance, in 2011 AKM made significant
proposals in the process of amending the Laws
on Public Private Partnership, Forestry, Public
Enterprises and Waste (AKM 2011: 2–3).
17 A local expert in decentralisation and local
governance pointed out that this politicisation
could be observed with respect to the
amendment of the Law on Publicly Owned
Enterprises and the transfer of competencies
to manage public enterprises, such as waste
collection, to the municipalities (authors’
interview with a representative of the Kosovo
Local Government Institute, Prishtina,
16 February 2012). 
18 In Peja municipality, for instance, we found
that the mayor is commonly referred to as
‘president’ and the chair of the municipal
assembly told the authors that citizens would
often confuse the roles of mayor and chair of
the municipal assembly, believing that the
mayor also served as the chair of the
municipal assembly (authors’ interviews,
senior local government officials, Peja,
21 February 2012). 
19 Authors’ interviews, NGO and international
donor representatives, Prishtina, 22, 24 April
2013.
20 Authors’ interviews, CSO representatives, Viti
and Peja, 14 and 21 February 2012.
21 Authors’ interviews, government, political
opposition, NGO and international donor
representatives, Prishtina, 22–24 April 2013;
authors’ interviews, NGO and international
donor representatives, Prishtina, 14–18 April
2014. 
22 Authors’ interview, senior government official,
Prishtina, 24 April 2013.
23 Authors’ interviews, NGO and international
donor representatives, Prishtina, 14–18, April
2014. 
24 Authors’ interviews, NGO and international
donor representatives, Prishtina 14–16 April
2014.
25 Authors’ interviews, NGO representatives,
Prishtina, 14, 16 April 2014.
26 Foremost the Democratic Party of Kosovo
(PDK), the Democratic League of Kosovo
(LDK) and the Alliance for the Future of
Kosovo (AAK).
27 Authors’ interviews, academic researcher and
donor representative, Prishtina, 23, 24 April
2013; authors’ interviews, NGO
representatives, Prishtina, 14, 16 April 2014. 
28 Authors’ interviews, NGO representatives,
Prishtina, 14 and 16 April 2014.
29 Authors’ interviews, NGO and donor
representatives, Prishtina, 14–18 April 2014.
30 Authors’ interviews, NGO and donor
representatives, Prishtina, 14–18 April 2014.
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